WebLevine thinks this and similar thought experiments show that there is an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world: even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physical things, because the link between physical things and consciousness is contingent link. In the philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the proposed difficulty that physicalist philosophies have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel subjectively when they are experienced. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph … See more The nature of the explanatory gap has been the subject of some debate. For example, some consider it to simply be a limit on our current explanatory ability. They argue that future findings in neuroscience or … See more • Joseph Levine's homepage • "What is it like to be a bat?" Archived 2011-10-16 at the Wayback Machine Thomas Nagel, The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435–50. See more • Animal consciousness • Blindsight • Causality • Consciousness • Explanation • Functionalism (philosophy of mind) See more
"Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap" – Joseph Levine …
http://ojs.mona.uwi.edu/index.php/cjp/article/viewFile/3943/3248 WebJan 15, 2006 · Abstract The explanatory gap concerns the problem of explaining the qualitative character of conscious experience by reference to underlying physical and … friend officiate wedding
Joseph Levine (philosopher) - Wikipedia
Weblabelled the “explanatory gap” by Joseph Levine (Levine, 1983, 2001). David Papineau described the situation in the following way (Papineau, 2002): when trying to accept the identity of phenomenal states with physical states, we face an intuition of distinctness. It seems to us that the two kinds of states simply cannot be identical. WebSome (e.g. Levine 2001) argue that the physical-phenomenal case involves a "thick" explanatory gap that is unlike those present in the standard cases. These disanalogies strongly suggest that the standard way of reconciling conceptual dualism with ontological monism does not apply to the conceptual dualism between the physical and the … WebApr 16, 2012 · Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (October) :354-61. Sosa, E. (1984). Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies of Philosophy, Vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. … friend of family movie